The Commission on “Unalienable Rights”: A Critique by Cassel, Douglass
Volume 11 Issue 1 Article 3 
1-31-2021 
The Commission on “Unalienable Rights”: A Critique 
Douglass Cassel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjicl 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cassel, Douglass (2021) "The Commission on “Unalienable Rights”: A Critique" Notre Dame Journal of 
International & Comparative Law: Vol. 11 : Iss. 1 , Article . 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative 
Law at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative 
Law by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu. 
The Commission on “Unalienable Rights”: A Critique 
Cover Page Footnote 
Emeritus Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School 
This article is available in Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/
ndjicl/vol11/iss1/3 
THE COMMISSION ON “UNALIENABLE RIGHTS”: A CRITIQUE 
 
DOUGLASS CASSEL* 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 2 
A. INAUGURATION ........................................................................................... 2 
B. MEMBERS .................................................................................................... 3 
C. REPORT AND REACTION ............................................................................... 4 
D. FUTURE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ................................................................... 5 
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS ...................................................... 6 
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES .................................................... 9 
A. PROFESSIONAL BODIES ............................................................................. 10 
B. POLITICAL BODIES .................................................................................... 12 
IV. U.S. PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES ......... 13 
V. THE NEED FOR OUR FOREIGN POLICY TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW BEYOND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE UDHR ...... 14 
A. UNIVERSALITY ........................................................................................... 16 
B. SPECIFICITY .............................................................................................. 17 
C. NEWLY PROTECTED GROUPS ..................................................................... 18 
D. NEWLY PROSCRIBED WRONGS ................................................................... 18 
E. NEWLY IDENTIFIED ACTORS ....................................................................... 19 
F. LIMITS ....................................................................................................... 20 
G. SUMMARY .................................................................................................. 20 
VI. MERITS OF THE REPORT .............................................................................. 20 
A. RACE ......................................................................................................... 21 
B. MODESTY .................................................................................................. 21 
C. UDHR ...................................................................................................... 22 
D. SOCIAL ISSUES ........................................................................................... 23 
E. BIPARTISAN HISTORY ................................................................................. 23 
F. GOVERNMENT PRIORITY ............................................................................. 24 
G. RUSSIA AND CHINA .................................................................................... 24 
H. FOREIGN POLICY ....................................................................................... 26 
VII. CRITICISMS OF THE REPORT ...................................................................... 26 
A. PROLIFERATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS ............................................. 27 
B. MEANING AND SCOPE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ................................................. 27 
C. RIGHTS HIERARCHIES ................................................................................ 28 
D. SOCIAL ISSUES ........................................................................................... 30 
E. NEW RIGHTS .............................................................................................. 31 























Consciously invoking the language of the U.S. Declaration of 
Independence,1 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in July 2019 announced the 
creation of a Commission on Unalienable Rights to advise him on principles of 
human rights to guide our foreign policy.2 
Even if the Commission had been blessed with an open-ended mandate, the 
task of advising on “unalienable” rights would have been daunting. 
Conceptually, “unalienable” and “human” rights are the same.3  They are rights 
inherent in all human beings. Governments can neither grant human rights nor 
take them away (“alienate” them). Governments can only “recognize” human 
rights.4   
The vexing challenge is to determine which rights meet this exalted 
standard. This is especially so because, over time, “the idea of human rights . . . 
is capable of encompassing new understandings of what freedom and equality 
require.”5 
But Secretary Pompeo’s Commission did not have an open-ended mandate. 
Its task was made even more difficult by its actual assignment: to ground its 
review in “our nation’s founding principles and [the principles of] the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (UDHR).6 
Our founding principles and the UDHR should be part of any review of the 
role of human rights in our foreign policy. But the whole? What about the 
expansive body of international human rights law and institutions developed and 
accepted by most of the world since 1948?  
In announcing the Commission, Secretary Pompeo had nothing positive to 
say about these post-1948 developments. He decried the proliferation of claims 
of rights. He lamented clashes between some rights. He posited confusion 
among states and international institutions about their responsibilities 
concerning rights. And he objected that international institutions for protection 
of human rights “have drifted from their original mission.”7   
 
 
1 “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
2 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SEC’Y OF STATE MICHAEL R. POMPEO REMARKS TO THE PRESS (2019), 
https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press-3/ [hereinafter 
Pompeo Remarks]. 
3 The Commission rightly recognizes that “unalienable rights” were “sometimes referred to as natural  
rights in the founding era” and “today are commonly called human rights.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT 
OF THE COMM’N ON UNALIENABLE RTS. (2020) at 11, https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/08/Report-of-the-Commission-on-Unalienable-Rights.pdf [hereinafter Report]. 
4 “The very notion of a human right is that of a right inherent in human beings and not dependent for its 
existence on the enactment of any state or international institution. Positive law can establish and 
clarify a state’s enforceable obligation to individuals and to other states. But positive law—whether 
that of a nation-state or of the international legal order—does not create a human right, nor can its 
silence or conduct nullify a human right.” Id. at 40-41.   
5 Id. at 38. 
6 Id. at 6; United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948 [hereinafter UDHR]; 
See also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CHARTER FOR THE COMM’N ON UNALIENABLE RTS. (2019), 
https://www.state.gov/charter-for-the-commission-on-unalienable-rights/. 
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Granted, there is some truth—but hardly an indictment—in these points. 
Claims of rights do proliferate; since 1948, many have been accepted by the 
overwhelming majority of the world’s nations and have become part of 
international law.8 Rights do sometimes clash and courts must resolve tensions 
between them; consider, for example, the clash between fair trial and free press 
embedded in the U.S. Constitution.9 Like any body of law, international human 
rights law does not give clear answers to all questions; they must be interpreted. 
And international human rights institutions at times stretch and arguably exceed 
their mandates.10 
But these partial truisms are not reasons to downplay all of modern 
international human rights law since 1948 and to treat our domestic law and a 
non-binding declaration of seven decades ago, as the overriding guides to human 
rights in foreign policy. As a broad coalition of human rights groups and 
advocates later commented, “[T]he validity of the human rights project is in no 
way imperiled by the increasing number of rights claims made by those whose 




Thus constrained by the restricted vision of its patron, the Commission was 
chaired by Harvard Law Professor Mary Ann Glendon. I am privileged to call 
Professor Glendon a friend and have long admired and learned from her 
scholarship on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.12  She is perhaps 
better known for declining to accept the University of Notre Dame’s Laetare 
Medal in 2009 after learning that President Obama would be the main 
commencement speaker and receive an honorary degree.13   
Another Commission member was my former colleague, Notre Dame Law 
Professor Paolo Carozza, Director of the Kellogg Institute for International 
Studies. Professor Carozza was a stalwart defender of human rights as a member 
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights from 2006 to 2010 and as 
its President from 2008 to 2009. More recently, he was appointed by the State 
Department (under Pompeo) to serve on the Venice Commission of the Council 
of Europe.14     
 
 
8 See Part II below. 
9 E.g., Nebraska Press Ass’n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
10 Among other examples, see Judge Humberto Sierra Porto’s dissent from the majority’s holding that 
economic, social and cultural rights are justiciable under Article 26 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights. Lagos del Campo v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 12.795 (Aug. 31, 2017). 
11 Letter to Mary Ann Glendon, Chairperson of the Comm’n on Unalienable Rts. (July 30, 2020), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/CUR%20Report%20Comment%20NGO%20Lett
er%20Final%2020.07.30.pdf [hereinafter Letter].   
12 E.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rts., 73 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1153 (1998); MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Random House, 1st ed. 2001). 
13 Mary Ann Glendon Refuses to Accept Laetare Medal from Notre Dame, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY 
(Apr. 27, 2009), 
https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/mary_ann_glendon_refuses_to_accept_laetare_medal_fr
om_notre_dame. 
14 Amanda Gray, Professor Paolo Carozza Appointed to Venice Commission, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME 
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Other members of Secretary Pompeo’s Commission consisted almost 
exclusively of his staff and religious advocates. The Executive Secretary, 
Rapporteur, and two of the ten original members were from his Policy Planning 
Staff.15 Of the remaining eight members, six had backgrounds in religious or 
religion-related institutions, and a seventh has published extensively on Roman 
Catholic bioethics.16   
 
C. REPORT AND REACTION 
 
After a year of study and public consultations, the Commission released a 
draft report in July 2020.17 Not unfairly characterizing the draft, Secretary 
Pompeo exulted that it “emphasizes foremost among these rights are property 
rights and religious liberty.”18 In his view, “[t]he vital 20th century human rights 
project has come unmoored, and it needs a re-grounding.”19 
A scant two weeks were allowed for public comment on the draft. The main 
response was a letter to Glendon from more than 100 human rights, social 
justice, and faith-based organizations, including groups such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch, and more than 100 individuals, 
including twenty-five former senior government officials, mostly from posts in 
the field of human rights. They charged that the Commission had been used to 
advance Pompeo’s “personal political and religious beliefs” and his “political 
agenda.”20 Criticizing the draft report on multiple grounds, they concluded that 
it “undermines decades of human rights progress.” 21  
In August, following what the Commission characterized as “only small 
changes,” the Commission published its final Report.22 In some respects, the 
Report is praiseworthy.23 Among other points noted below, the Commission 
recommends that “it is urgent to champion human rights in foreign policy.”24 
 
 
15 Commission on Unalienable Rights: Member Bios, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://www.state.gov/commission-on-unalienable-rights-member-bio.The original Executive 
Secretary, Kiron Skinner, was later replaced by Peter Berkowitz. Professor Kenneth Anderson of 
American University, not on the original list, joined the Commission later. 
16 Id. Chairperson Glendon (U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom); Paolo Carroza 
(Notre Dame); Hamza Yusuf Hanson (President of Zaytuna College, a Muslim liberal arts college); 
Dr. Jacqueline Rivers (Director of Seymour Institute for Black Church and Policy Studies); Rabbi Dr. 
Meir Soloveichik (Congregation Shearith Israel); and Katrina Lantos Swett (U.S. Commission on 
International Religious Freedom). Professor Christopher Tollefson’s books include, for example, JOHN 
PAUL II’S CONTRIBUTION TO CATHOLIC BIOETHICS (Springer 2004).  
17 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON UNALIENABLE RTS. (2020), 
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Draft-Report-of-the-Commission-on-
Unalienable-Rights.pdf. The July 16 version of the Report was nowhere marked as a “draft.” In 
formally presenting it to Secretary Pompeo, Chairperson Glendon referred to it four times as “our 
Report,” never mentioning the word “draft.” See infra note 18. 
18 Michael Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, Speech on Unalienable Rights and the Securing of Freedom 
(July 16, 2020), https://www.state.gov/unalienable-rights-and-the-securing-of-freedom/. The views of 
the Report on these rights are discussed in part VII below.  
19 Id. 
20 Letter, supra note 11.   
21 Id. The criticisms are discussed in Part VII below. 
22 Commission U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Commission Note on Releasing its Final Report, 
https://www.state.gov/report-of-the-commission-on-unalienable-rights. 
23 See Part VI below. 
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However—true to the Commission’s constricted mandate—this 
recommendation explicitly refers only to human rights in the 1948 UDHR.25 The 
entire Report refers only in passing to the two main UN human rights treaties—
even though the U.S. is a party to one and has signed the other.26 The Report 
does not even mention seven other core UN human rights treaties, except to note 
that the U.S. is a party to two of them.27 Downplaying the post-1948 treaties as 
mere “positive law,”28 the Report asserts—incorrectly, in my view—that 
positive international human rights law cannot be an “authoritative and final 
arbiter of legal disputes.”29  
The Report does recognize, but only in very general terms, that post-1948 
international human rights treaties have “achieved tangible results.”30 They can 
reflect a “broadening consensus” among nations about human rights.31  Their 
creation of “hard legal requirements, often monitored and promoted by 
supervisory institutions, enhances the protection of human rights.”32   
Yet the Report quickly adds that states and scholars question whether the 
“multiplication of human rights in treaties is an unalloyed good.”33 Even leading 
human rights advocates question whether the multiplication of treaties is an 
“unalloyed” good.34 But if, as the Commission recognizes, the treaties have been 
“goods” and have achieved “tangible results,” what is the good, what are the 
results, and why not discuss the provisions of the treaties? The Report does not 
elaborate on these questions. 
 
D. FUTURE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
 
Beyond the few core treaties already ratified by the U.S., what part of 
contemporary international human rights law should help guide U.S. foreign 
policy? For example, and especially given our particular history of mistreating 
Native Americans,35 should our foreign policy respect the rights of Indigenous 




26 Id. at 34, 46–47. 
27 Id. at 47. 
28 Id. at 40–41. 
29 Id. at 40. See infra notes 84 and 85.  
30 Id. at 40.  
31 Id.  
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 See, e.g., Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. 
INT’L LAW 607 (1984). 
35 See, e.g., the history recited in McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020); See also Report, supra 
note 3, at 43: “In the 19th century, under the flag of Manifest Destiny, the United States cruelly 
expelled Native Americans from their ancestral lands with tremendous cost in human life and 
compelled them to enter into treaties that it failed to honor.” 
36 G.A. Res. 61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007). Although the U.S. did not vote for it initially, President Obama 
declared U.S. support for it in 2016. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR 
THE U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RTS. OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE (2016), https://2009-
2017.state.gov/documents/organization/184099.pdf. The Commission Report mentions neither the 







6 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.  vol. XI:1 
of 1776, the U.S. Constitution of 1789,37 or the UDHR of 1948? Or should our 
diplomats ignore indigenous rights because they are recognized in a Declaration 
rather than a binding treaty? 
Apparently, the Commission—not without reason—viewed such questions 
as beyond its mandate. But future U.S. foreign policymakers should not be so 
limited. The time when international human rights law was circumscribed by the 
principles of the 1948 UDHR is long past. Yet the only specific reference in the 
Commission’s proposed criteria for recognizing new claims of rights is to the 
1948 UDHR. There is no express mention of any of the widely supported treaties 
and declarations reflecting the broad consensus on human rights in subsequent 
decades.38   
In responding to the Secretary’s constricted questions, the Commission’s 
Report thus addresses only a portion of the human rights norms that should guide 
our foreign policy. That is what Secretary Pompeo asked for and what the 
Commission delivered. Neither the American people nor U.S. diplomats should 
follow so narrow an approach.   
 
 
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 
 
Until 1945, with few exceptions,39 human rights were deemed to be the 
exclusive province of domestic laws and constitutions. At the conclusion of 
World War II in 1945, the horrors of the Holocaust, the brutality of fascism, 
mounting protests against colonialism, racial segregation in the U.S., and other 
affronts against human rights led citizen groups and some states to lobby for, 
and states generally to accept, a radical change: human rights were now to be a 
concern of international law and institutions.40 The Charter of the United Nations 
lists as one of its purposes to “achieve international co-operation . . . in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”41All 
U.N. members pledge to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the 
U.N. to achieve these purposes.42 
Thus began modern international human rights law. In 1948, the U.N. 
adopted the UDHR,43 which includes a broad spectrum of civil and political as 
 
 
37 See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2,462, citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553, 566–68 (1903), (“To 
determine whether a tribe continues to hold a reservation, there is only one place we may look: The 
Acts of Congress. This Court long ago held that the Legislature wields significant constitutional 
authority when it comes to tribal relations, possessing even the authority to breach its own promises 
and treaties.”).  
38 Report, supra note 3, at 39–40. 
39 See generally Paul Gordon Lauren, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS 
SEEN (Univ. Pennsylvania Press 2011). 
40 Id. at 165-94. The Commission apparently places the dividing line at 1948: “But after the Universal 
Declaration, no state may reasonably claim that the treatment of its own citizens in matters of human 
rights is solely a question of its own domestic affairs.” Report at 30. 
41 U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3. 
42 Id. arts. 55–56. 
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well as economic, social, and cultural rights.44 Also in 1948, the U.N. adopted 
its first major human rights treaty: The Convention against Genocide.45 
Progress thereafter slowed during the height of the Cold War. However, as 
decolonization spread, the increasing numbers of newly independent states in 
the U.N. General Assembly pressed for, and in 1965 secured, the first of what 
are now nine core U.N. human rights treaties: the Convention against Racial 
Discrimination.46  Each core treaty defines a set of rights, which are monitored 
by committees of experts who adopt general guides to interpretation, receive and 
evaluate periodic reports from states, hold public hearings with public comment 
on the reports, and render opinions on complaints against those states which 
accept individual complaint procedures.47 
In chronological order, the topics of the nine core treaties, with their year of 
adoption and current number of states parties,48 are as follows: 
 
• Racial Discrimination:49 1966, 182 states parties; 
• Civil and Political Rights:50 1966, 173 states parties; 
• Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:51 1966, 171 states 
parties; 
• Discrimination against Women:52 1979, 189 states 
parties; 
• Torture:53 1984, 171 states parties;  
• Children:54 1990, 196 states parties; 
• Migrant Workers:55 1990, 55 states parties; 
• Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD”):56 2006, 182 states 
parties; and 




44 See Report supra note 3, at 29–30. For broader analysis, see Glendon, supra note 12. 
45 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 
78 U.N.T.S. 277. 152 states parties are parties to Convention as of August 30, 2020. 
46 United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
47 See generally U.N. Office of the High Comm’r of Human Rights, Monitoring the Core International 
Human Rights Treaties, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/Overview.aspx (showing dates 
of adoption and the numbers of state parties as of December 8, 2020). 
48 See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General: 
Chapter IV: Human Rights, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&clang=_en. 
49 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 46. 
50 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]. 
51 United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
52 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. [hereinafter CEDAW] 
53 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
54 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
55 United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3. 
56 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 
3. 
57 United Nations International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
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As shown by the numbers of states parties, seven of the core treaties have 
been joined by 170 or more states, and four by more than 180 states (compared 
to the total U.N. membership of 193 states).58  Plainly these seven treaties 
represent a broad international consensus on legally binding human rights 
which, in many respects, are broader or more specific than provided by the 1948 
Declaration.59  They thus satisfy one of the Commission’s proposed criteria for 
recognizing “new rights,” because they “represent a clear consensus across a 
broad plurality of different traditions and cultures in the human family, as the 
Universal Declaration did, and not merely a narrower partisan or ideological 
interest.”60 
If one looks to “like-minded democracies”—another Commission criterion 
for recognizing new rights61—the consensus on these seven treaties is even more 
overwhelming. All seven have been joined by (among many other states) 
European democracies like Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.62 Democracies elsewhere like Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Ghana, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, South 
Korea (Republic of Korea), and Uruguay have likewise joined all seven 
treaties.63 
Some states make reservations to some treaties.64  But that is an argument 
for the U.S. to consider reservations to particular treaties—not to ignore them in 
our foreign policy. 
Two core treaties, on migrant workers and enforced disappearances, are not 
widely ratified. The migrant workers treaty has been joined mainly by 
predominantly migrant exporting countries, and not by predominantly receiving 
countries like the U.S. On the other hand, and despite committing our own 
disappearances in counterterrorism activities,65 U.S. foreign policy has long 
viewed enforced disappearances as a key human rights issue.66 
In addition to treaties, the U.N. has adopted numerous, non-binding 
instruments on human rights. Many are widely supported, including by U.S. 
Administrations. In addition to the 1948 UDHR, they include, for example, the 
 
 
58 See United Nations, Growth in U.N. Membership: 1945-Present, 
https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-
present/index.html. 
59 See Part IV below. 
60 Report, supra note 3, at 40. 
61 Id. at 39. One Commission criterion is: “Have the United States and other like-minded democracies 
formally given their sovereign consent to the development in question through the established political 
mechanisms for creating international law (in particular through the adoption of clear and explicit 
treaty provisions)?”  
62 See U.N. Secretary General, supra note 48. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. Reservations are shown at the United Nations Treaty Collection, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&clang=_en. 
65 See e.g., The United States’ “Disappeared”: The CIA’s Long-Term Ghost Detainees, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH at 1 (2004). 
66 U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights have long included a section on 
disappearances. See Dept. of State, 2019 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, app. A: 
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1946 resolution on the Nuremberg Principles,67 the 1998 declaration on human 
rights defenders,68 the 2005 resolution on remedies for victims of human rights 
violations,69 the 2007 declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples,70 the 2010 
resolution on the right to clean water and sanitation,71 the 2011 Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights,72 and the 2015 Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules).73   
While there are of course other, controversial U.N. resolutions, such widely 
supported instruments as the foregoing should inform U.S. foreign policy on 
human rights. Indeed, as the Commission recognizes, “some of the most 
significant human rights landmarks and achievements have had a primarily 
extra-legal and diplomatic-political character, such as the Helsinki Accords and 
the Inter-American Democratic Charter.”74 
In addition to U.N. instruments, there are also human rights treaties and 
declarations (like the Helsinki Accords and the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter) adopted by regional and sub-regional organizations, as in Europe,75 the 
Americas,76 Africa,77 Arab nations,78 and Southeast Asia.79 Most do not apply 
to the U.S. and a few of their provisions are inconsistent with universal norms,80 
but most of their provisions can be considered by U.S. foreign policy toward 
those countries which adopt them. 
 
 
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES 
 
Two kinds of bodies monitor and attempt to enforce international human 
rights treaties and declarations: professional and political. The professional 
bodies include the U.N. treaty committees for the core treaties mentioned above. 
 
 
67 G.A. Res. 95(l), Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, at 1 (Dec. 11, 1946). 
68 See generally G.A. Res. 53/144, annex, Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, 
Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Dec. 9, 1998).  
69 See generally G.A. Res. 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Int’l Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of Int’l 
Humanitarian Law (Dec. 16, 2005). 
70 G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007).  Although 
the U.S. did not vote for it initially, President Obama declared U.S. support for it in 2016. G.A. Res. 
(2007) supra note 36.    
71 G.A. Res. 64/292, The Human Right to Water and Sanitation (July 28, 2010). 
72 Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, (Mar. 21, 2011).  
73 G.A. Res. 70/175, The Nelson Mandela Rules (Dec. 17, 2015). 
74 Report, supra note 3, at 41. 
75 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 
4, 1950, 2889 U.N.T.S. 213, and subsequent protocols [hereinafter European Convention on Human 
Rights]; 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1; Org. for Sec. and Cooperation in Europe, Human Dimension 
Commitments, Vols. 1 and 2, https://www.osce.org/odihr/what-is-the-human-dimension. 
76 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (May 2, 1948); American Convention on 
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
77 African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217. 
78 Arab Charter of Human Rights, September 15, 2004, League of Arab states [LAS].  
79 Association ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, November 19, 2012, Ass’n of Se. Asian Nations 
[ASEAN]. 
80 E.g., Mervat M. Rishmawi, The Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights: A Step Forward?, 5 HUMAN 
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Their members are selected for expertise in human rights and are directed to vote 
in their individual capacities.81 Other professional bodies are discussed below.   
The political bodies vary, but at their center is the much-criticized—for 
good reason—U.N. Human Rights Council. The Council’s forty-seven members 
are not individuals but states whose representatives in the Council vote 
according to the foreign policies of their governments.82 
 
A. PROFESSIONAL BODIES 
 
In addition to the nine U.N. treaty committees mentioned above, global and 
regional human rights bodies include courts, commissions, and rapporteurs, 
selected for their expertise in human rights, law, or related fields, and instructed 
to apply international norms, rather than to follow instructions from their 
governments. Because most are elected by governments, some professional 
positions become occupied by individuals who lack ability, human rights 
credentials, or independence.83 In my experience as a scholar and practitioner 
over the last thirty years, however, a clear majority of the individuals elected are 
both qualified and independent. 
The Commission observes that “standards emanating from international 
commissions and committees, individual experts, and advocacy groups—may 
be useful sources of reflection about the appropriate scope of human rights, but 
they lack the formal authority of law.”84 
That may be true of many experts and committees. However, it overlooks 
those who are judges on international human rights courts. Their judgments are 
indeed a source of law, both under general international law,85 and, for states in 
the cases before them, under the treaties that establish their courts.86 
The U.N. has no court specifically for human rights. However, human rights 
claims are sometimes presented by states, or human rights questions presented 
 
 
81 For example, members of the Human Rights Committee, which is the monitoring committee for the 
Civil and Political Covenant, “shall be persons of high moral character and recognized competence in 
the field of human rights, consideration being given to the usefulness of the participation of some 
persons having legal experience.” ICCPR supra note 50, at art. 28.2.  They are to perform their 
functions “impartially.”  Id. at art. 38. 
82 G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶ 7 (Mar. 15, 2006).  
83 See, e.g., Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., D.Somoza’s Revenge: A New Judge for the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. L.J. 137, 137–38 (1992). 
84 Report, supra note 3, at 40. 
85 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(d) (ICJ to apply “judicial decisions . . . as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”) and art. 59 (“The decision of the Court has no 
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”) – which of course 
means that the judgment does have “binding force” between the parties in that case. In Medellin v. 
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, (2008), the majority interpreted UN Charter art. 94, requiring that states 
“undertake to comply” with ICJ judgments, not to obligate the U.S. to comply.  I believe this view was 
in error, for the reasons aptly stated by Justice Breyer for three justices in dissent. 
86 E.g., European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 75, art. 46, art. 46.1 (“The High Contracting 
Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.”); 
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 76, art. 68.1 (“The states partiesstates parties to 
the Convention undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case to which they are 
parties.”); June 10, 1998, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 10, 1998, Org. of African 
Unity [OAU], art. 30 (“The states parties to the present Protocol undertake to comply with the 
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by U.N. organs, and resolved by the International Court of Justice.87 The 
International Criminal Court (which is related to but not part of the U.N.)88 has 
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, which 
often involve violations of human rights.89 
In contrast, specialized human rights courts have been created by regional 
organizations in Europe, the Americas, and Africa.90 From 1959 through 2019, 
the European Court of Human Rights has rendered more than 22,000 
judgments.91 Since 1987 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
rendered over 400 judgments in contested cases,92 and twenty-five advisory 
opinions.93 Since 2009, the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights has 
made final decisions in 100 contested cases,94 and decided twelve requests for 
advisory opinions.95   
The result is a rich body of international human rights jurisprudence. As in 
national legal systems, most judgments are not legally groundbreaking, but 
many are controversial.96 
Professionals are also selected as special rapporteurs or experts on human 
rights themes or on human rights in troubled countries, and report annually to 
the U.N. Human Rights Council.97 Hundreds of professionals are on the staff of 
 
 
87 E.g., Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment, 2012 
I.C. J. 422 (July 20). The ICJ also renders advisory opinions, at the request of competent U.N. organs, 
some of which address human rights. E.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136. (July 9). 
88 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art.2, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. 
89 Id., arts. 5-8. Shamefully, the Trump Administration has authorized and imposed financial and visa 
sanctions on ICC lawyers investigating cases involving the U.S. See Ellen Nakashima and Carol 
Morello, Lawyers Urge Trump to Rescind Sanctions and Travel Bans for International Criminal Court, 
WASH. POST (June 29, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/lawyers-urge-
trump-to-rescind-sanctions-and-travel-bans-for-international-criminal-court/2020/06/29/0ef0c476-
ba15-11ea-86d5-3b9b3863273b_story.html.  
90 Some sub-regional courts also address human rights matters in some cases.  E.g., Koraou v. Niger, 
Judgment No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08/ Judgment (Oct. 27, 2008) (Niger held liable for slavery). 
91 Overview 1959-2019, at 3, Eur. Ct. H.Rts (Feb. 2020).  
92 Judgements, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., https://www.corteidh.or.cr/casos_sentencias.cfm?lang=en. 
93 Advisory Opinions, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 
https://www.corteidh.or.cr/opiniones_consultivas.cfm?lang=en. 
94 Contentious Matters, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Ct. H.P.R], https://en.african-
court.org/index.php/cases. 
95 Advisory Opinions, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., https://en.african-court.org/index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-19-
35. 
96 See, e.g., Alvaro Paul, Decision-Making Process of the Inter-American Court: An Analysis Prompted 
by the in Vitro Fertilization Case, 21 ILSA J. INT’L & COM. L. 87 (2014); O. Bowcott, Council of 
Europe Accepts UK Compromise on Prisoner Voting Rights, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/dec/07/council-of-europe-accepts-uk-compromise-on-
prisoner-voting-rights. 
97 There are currently forty-two thematic mandates, listed at 
https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx?Type=TM&lang=en, and nine country 
mandates (for Belarus, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Iran, Mali, Myanmar, occupied 
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the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.98 Others are members or staff 
of regional human rights commissions.99   
 
B. POLITICAL BODIES 
 
The main political body is the U.N. Human Rights Council.100  Although 
the election of its forty-seven member states is supposed to “take into account” 
their human rights records,101 the reality is sometimes otherwise. Recent 
members include, for example, Eritrea, the Philippines, and Venezuela,102 none 
of whose recent records on human rights are admirable.103 
It is fair to say that both the election of some members to the Council, and 
some of its decisions,104 have at times given human rights a bad name. When the 
U.S. withdrew in protest from the Council in 2018,105 U.S. Ambassador Nikki 
Haley described the Council as a “hypocritical and self-serving organization that 
makes a mockery of human rights.”106 
However, no other nation followed the U.S. example. Then U.K. Foreign 
Secretary Boris Johnson, for example, termed the U.S. decision “regrettable,” 
arguing that while reforms are needed, the UNHRC is “crucial to holding states 
to account.’”107 In a broad-based organization on the international plane, there 
is probably no realistic way to avoid the political involvement of governments 
of varying stripes, whether in human rights or in other fields. And, as noted 
earlier, treaties negotiated by governments, and resolutions they adopt in 
political bodies—both by the Council and by the U.N. General Assembly, and 
 
 
98 The High Commissioner had some 1,300 staff as of December 2017, counting administrative staff as 
well as human rights professionals. Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network 
[MOPAN], OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’N FOR HUMAN RTS. (OHCHR): 2017-18 PERFORMANCE 
ASSESSMENT, 13 (Apr. 2019).   
99 The oldest and largest is the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, with seven elected 
commissioners and, as of 2019, 134 staff, including administrative and contract staff. Annual Report 
2019, Ch. VI,¶  A.1, INT’L.-AM. COMM’N. H.R. Other regional commissions have small staffs: for 
example, the eleven-member African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the ten-member 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights.   
100 Political bodies in regional organizations have varying records on human rights. See, e.g., Douglass 
Cassel, Regional Human Rights Systems and State Pushback: The Case of the Inter-American Human 
Rights System (2011–2013), 33 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, (2013).  
101 G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶ 8 (Mar. 15, 2006).  
102 Current Membership of the Human Rights Council for the 14th cycle, 1 January – 31 December 
2020, OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’N FOR HUMAN RTS, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/CurrentMembers.aspx. 
103 Freedom House most recently rates Eritrea as “not free,” the Philippines as “partly free,” and 
Venezuela as “not free.” Countries and Territories, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores. 
104 See, e.g., Lula Ahrens, UN Human Rights Council Faces the Same Criticism as its Predecessor, 
GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (May 21, 2010), https://www.globalpolicy.org/un-reform/un-reform-
topics/human-rights-council/49143-un-human-rights-council-faces-the-same-criticism-as-its-
predecessor.html. 
105 Report, supra note 3, at 49. 
106 Colin Dwyer, U.S. Announces its Withdrawal from U.N. Human Rights Council, NPR (June 19, 2018, 
5:09 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/19/621435225/u-s-announces-its-withdrawal-from-u-n-s-
human-rights-council.  








2021 THE COMMISSION ON “UNALIENABLE RIGHTS” 13 
even at times by the Security Council108—have made important normative and 
operational advances in human rights. 
 
 
IV. U.S. PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
 
Of the seven core human rights treaties joined by all the democracies listed 
in Part II above (and by the vast majority of states in the world), the U.S. has 
joined only three: the Civil and Political Covenant, and the treaties against 
torture and racial discrimination.109  That hardly means, however, that our 
foreign policy should ignore the other widely ratified core treaties on the rights 
of women, children, and persons with disabilities and on economic, social, and 
cultural rights.   
In addition to three core treaties, the U.S. has joined such other human rights 
treaties as: the 1948 Genocide Convention110 (152 states parties), the 1953 
Convention on the Political Rights of Women111 (123 states parties), the 1957 
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women112 (75 states parties), the 1957 
International Labor Organization (“ILO”) convention  on forced labor113 (176 
states parties114 ), the 1999 ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child 
Labor115 (187 states parties116), the Optional Protocols of 2000 to the children’s 
rights convention on child soldiers117 (170 states parties) and on the sale of 
children, child prostitution and child pornography118 (176 states parties).119 
The U.S. has also joined other treaties relating to human rights (although 
categorized differently under international law), including the 1949 Geneva 
Convention on protection of civilians in wartime120 (196 states parties121), the 
 
 
108 E.g., U.N. Sec. Council Res. 2493, ¶ 5 (Oct. 29, 2019) (calling on member states “to promote all the 
rights of women, including civil, political and economic rights”). 
109 See ratification tables at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&clang=_en. See 
also Report, supra note 3, at 47 and Part VII below. 
110 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Dec. 9,1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 
277. 
111 United Nations Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 193 U.N.T.S. 135. 
112 United Nations Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, Feb. 20, 1957, 309 U.N.T.S. 65. 
113 Int’l Labor Org., Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, June 25, 1957, No. 105. 
114 Id. 
115 Int’l Labor Org., Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, June 17, 1999, No. 182.  




117 United Nations, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement 
of Children in Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222. 
118 United Nations, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, May 25, 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227. 
119 See ratification tables at the United Nations Treaty Collection, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&clang=_en (last visited Dec 1, 2020). 
120 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War, Aug. 12, 1949; see ratification table at https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/states.xsp?xp_viewstates=XPages_NORMstatesParties&xp_treat
ySelected=380 (last visited Dec 1, 2020). 
121 See list at https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/states.xsp?xp_viewstates=XPages_NORMstatesParties&xp_treat
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1977 Geneva Protocol I on protection of victims of armed conflict122 (174 states 
parties123), and the 1967 protocol on refugees124 (147 states parties). 
 
 
V. THE NEED FOR OUR FOREIGN POLICY TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW BEYOND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE UDHR 
 
At a general level, U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, the UDHR, and post-
1948 international human rights law embody common, underlying values. These 
include especially life,125 liberty,126 equality,127 dignity,128  
 
 
122 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 
https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=D9E6B6264D7723C3C12563CD002D6
CE4&action=openDocument (last visited Dec 1, 2020). 
123 Id.  
124 United Nations, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
125 E.g., U.S. Const. amend. V (no deprivation of life without due process of law); UDHR supra note 6, 
at art. 3, Dec. 10, 1948 (“right to life”); ICCPR supra note 50 art. 6.1, Dec. 19, 1966 (“inherent right 
to life”). 
126 E.g., U.S. Const. amend. V (no deprivation of liberty without due process of law); UDHR, supra note 
6, at art. 3 (“right to . . . liberty”); ICCPR, supra note 50, at art. 9.1 (“right to liberty”). 
127 E.g., U.S. Const. amend. XIV (“Equal protection of the laws”); UDHR, supra note 6, at art. 1 (“All 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”), art. 2 (UDHR rights “without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.”), art. 7 (equality before the law and equal protection of the law.), 
art. 16 (men and women “entitled to equal rights as to marriage . . . ”); ICCPR, supra note 50, at 
Preamble (“inherent dignity of the human person”), art. 2.1 (states to ensure rights “without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.”), art. 3 (“equal right of men and women” to civil and political 
rights), art. 14.1 (equality before courts and tribunals), art. 24.1 (child’s right to protection “without 
any discrimination”), art. 26 (equality before the law and equal protection of the law. No discrimination 
on any ground “such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.”). 
128 E.g., U.S. Const. amend. VIII (prohibiting “cruel and unusual punishments”); UDHR, supra note 6, 
at art. 1 (“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”), art. 5 (no “torture or . . . 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”); ICCPR, supra note 50, at art. 7 (no “torture 
or . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment . . . . [N]o one shall be subjected without 
his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”), art. 10.1 (“All persons deprived of their 
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community,129 autonomy,130 and security.131   
But if the underlying values are the same, should not the U.S. Constitution 
and UDHR suffice (as the Commission Report implies) to guide U.S. foreign 
policy on human rights? 
Despite its limited mandate, the Commission does not argue for simply 
ignoring post-1948 international human rights law.  Its Report acknowledges 
that “[m]uch has been done in the decades since the approval of the UDHR to 
go beyond these aspirational and pedagogical goals by translating its principles 
into legally binding obligations, principally through treaties.”132 Indeed, “[t]he 
collective effort since 1948 to translate the UDHR’s broad principles of human 
rights into binding legal commitments through a network of treaties has achieved 
laudable results.”133 
Nonetheless, the Commission downplays post-1948 international human 
rights law.  First, its Report barely mentions this body of law.  Second, the Report 
implies that these laws depend, for effectiveness, on the moral and political 
commitments of the UDHR134—as if embodying norms in law somehow 
weakens, rather than strengthens, their moral force.135 And third, the Report 
downgrades treaty law as mere “positive law,” which does not “create” human 
rights136—overlooking the fact that the UDHR likewise did not “create,” but 
merely recognized human rights. 
There are at least five reasons why the U.S. Constitution and UDHR are not, 
by themselves, sufficient, and why post-UDHR international human rights law 
should not be virtually ignored, or downgraded as mere positive law.137  They 
are (1) universality, (2) specificity, (3) newly protected groups, (4) newly 
proscribed wrongs, and (5) newly identified actors.  
 
 
129 The U.S. Constitution does not directly authorize the judiciary to impose communitarian values.  
However, courts defer to legislative takings of private property for a “public purpose,” including the 
welfare of the community as a whole, e.g., Hawaii Housing Auth. V. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) 
(Hawaii Land Reform Act designed to “attack certain perceived evils of concentrated property 
ownership” had “legitimate public purpose.”); International norms are more explicit, e.g., UDHR, 
supra note 6, at art. 1 (All human beings “should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”), 
art. 22 (“right to social security”), art. 29 (“duties to the community”); ICCPR, supra note 50, at art. 
23.1 (“The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by 
society and the State.”). 
130 E.g., U.S. Const. amend. I (freedom of speech and religion), amend. 4 (“right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,  against unreasonable searches 
and seizures”), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy); UDHR, supra note 6, at 
art. 12 (no “arbitrary interference with . . . privacy, family, home or correspondence…”), art. 18 
(“freedom of thought, conscience and religion”), art. 19 (“freedom of opinion and expression”); 
ICCPR, supra note 50, at arts. 17.1 (no “arbitrary or unlawful interference with . . . privacy, family, 
home or correspondence”), 18.1 (“freedom of thought, conscience and religion”), art. 19.1 (“right to 
hold opinions without interference”), 19.2 (“freedom of expression”). 
131 E.g., U.S. Const. amend. II (well-regulated militia “necessary to the security of a free state”); UDHR, 
supra note 6, at art. 3 (“security of person”), art. 5 (no “torture or . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”), art. 9 (no “arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.”), art. 25 (“right to a standard 
of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family”); ICCPR, supra note 50, 
at art. 7 (no “torture or . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”), art. 9.1 (“right to . 
. . security of person”). 
132 Report, supra note 3, at 31–32. 
133 Id. at 58. 
134 Id. at 32. 
135 See, e.g., LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (Yale Univ. Press. rev. ed. 1969). 
136 Report, supra note 3, at 41. 











As the Commission recognizes, universal human rights cannot be 
photocopied in every aspect everywhere; within limits, they do and must allow 
for variations in the extent and manner of their recognition and implementation, 
in the context of diverse “political, economic, cultural, religious, and legal 
traditions.”138  The U.S. Constitution cannot be the template for human rights 
everywhere. 
Consider, for example, one of the rights which Secretary Pompeo regards as 
“foremost”: freedom of religion.139  The U.S. Constitution,140 the UDHR,141 and 
post-1948 international human rights law,142 all provide for the free exercise of 
religion and prohibit discrimination based on religion.  But the U.S. 
Constitution’s First Amendment, reflecting our particular history as a haven for 
religious dissidents, goes a step further: it prohibits Congress from making any 
law respecting an “establishment of religion. . . .”143  
In contrast, many other nations, including democracies, have established 
religions in one form or another. Yet few Americans would suggest that we 
should denounce violations of human rights in England because the official 
religion is the Church of England,144 or in Germany because it privileges 
Christian faiths,145 or in Greece because the Orthodox Church is the State 
religion.146 In these and other countries, it is enough that the State does not limit 
the free exercise of religion, and does not otherwise discriminate against those 
who believe in a particular faith or in no faith at all. 
Another example is the right to fair trial. In the U.S., as in many common 
law countries, the right to trial by jury is deemed fundamental to a fair trial in 
significant cases.147 Most nations of the world, however, do not use juries.148 
The UDHR accordingly does not refer to juries, and international human rights 
law does not require trial by jury. As with the ban on established religion, our 







138 Id. at 32. 
139 Pompeo, supra note 18. 
140 U.S. Const. amend. I, XIV. 
141 UDHR, supra note 6, at arts. 2 and 18. 
142 E.g., ICCPR supra note 50, at arts. 2.1 and 18. 
143 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
144 E.g, Bérengère Massignon, Confrontations Europe: The Countries of Europe: All Secular, All 
Different!, Jan. 25, 2015, http://confrontations.org/admin/the-countries-of-europe-all-secular-all-
different/. 
145 Id. 
146 Id.  See Constitution of Greece (2008), §2, art. 3.1. 
147 U.S. Const. amends. VI (criminal cases) and VII (civil cases). As the Commission notes, James 
Madison in 1789 conceded that trial by jury was not a “natural right,” but he nonetheless thought it 
“essential.” Report, supra note 3, at 18.  Most legal cultures of the world, then and now, do not agree 
that it is essential.  
148 However, many countries utilize other forms of lay participation in judicial decision-making.  See 
generally Valerie P. Hans, Jury Systems Around the World, CORNELL L. FACULTY PUBL’NS, 305 
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B. SPECIFICITY 
 
Although “universal” by definition, the UDHR is also quite general. Widely 
supported human rights treaties and declarations are not only less culturally 
specific than the U.S. Constitution, they are also not as generally worded as the 
UDHR.  They are both universal (or nearly so) and relatively specific in defining 
rights. 
Consider, again, the right to fair trial. The UDHR provides for a “fair and 
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. . . .”149 and for “the 
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public 
trial at which [the accused] has had all the guarantees necessary for his 
defence.”150 
But what are those “guarantees” necessary for defense?151 The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted in 1966 and now joined by 173 
states (including the U.S.), supplies a more specific answer. In criminal cases, 
they include the “following minimum guarantees”152:  
 
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he 
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him; 
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing; 
(c) To be tried without undue delay; 
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or 
through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does 
not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance 
assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, 
and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have 
sufficient means to pay for it; 
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to 
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under 
the same conditions as witnesses against him; 
(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand 
or speak the language used in court; 
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.” 
 
Even in civil cases, what is a “public” trial?  The U.S. Constitution does not 
define “public,” U.S. Supreme Court interpretations do not govern other nations, 
and the UDHR likewise does not define a “public” trial.  In contrast, the Civil 
and Political Covenant clarifies: 
 
The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a 
trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or 
national security in a democratic society, or when the interest 
 
 
149 UDHR, supra note 6, at art. 10. 
150 UDHR, supra note 6, at art. 11(1). 
151 As the Commission notes, the “’right to a fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial 
tribunal’ leaves undefined the details of what specifically constitutes independence, impartiality, and 
even a tribunal.” Report, supra note 3, at 32. 
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of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent 
strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special 
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of 
justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a 
suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of 
juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern 
matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children.153 
 
Thus, if U.S. foreign policy on human rights were to be guided only or 
primarily by our nation’s founding documents and the UDHR, with little or no 
reliance on post-1948 international human rights law, U.S. diplomats would be 
hampered, both in assessing whether other nations conduct fair trials and in 
persuading the world at large to credit our assessments. U.S. Constitutional 
provisions on fair trial are too country-specific, while the UDHR is too general. 
To be grounded in criteria that are both universal and specific, our foreign policy 
needs to embrace international human rights law and policy, embodied in widely 
supported treaties and declarations,154 except where contrary to our values.  
 
C. NEWLY PROTECTED GROUPS 
 
Groups whose rights were not expressly recognized in 1948, or were hardly 
recognized, are now widely accepted as needing specific recognition in order to 
ensure their human rights. For example, the UDHR does not mention persons 
with disabilities, who are now protected by a treaty joined by 182 states,155 or 
Indigenous Peoples, whose rights are now recognized by a declaration that 
enjoys broad support.156   
The UDHR barely mentioned children. They were merely “entitled to 
special care and assistance,” and implicitly entitled to free primary education.157 
Yet their rights are now specified extensively by the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child—a treaty joined by every U.N. member State (except the U.S.).158   
 
D. NEWLY PROSCRIBED WRONGS 
 
Even previously protected groups—such as women—are now protected 
from additional wrongs. For example, the UDHR expressly recognized the right 
of women to equal rights,159 but did not expressly protect them from sexual 
violence and sexual harassment. In contrast, the 1981 Convention against 
 
 
153 ICCPR, supra note 50, at art. 14.1. 
154 E.g., G.A. Res. 40/146, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (Dec. 13, 1985). 
155 U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 45; U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 54. 
156 G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007). The 
Resolution was adopted by a vote of 144 to 4 (with 11 abstentions).  Since then, all four opposing 
states have reversed their positions and now support the Declaration.  See G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007).  Although the U.S. initially voted 
against, President Obama declared U.S. support for the Declaration in 2016.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
supra note 36.   
157 UDHR, supra note 6, at arts. 25(2) and 26(1). 
158 U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 48; CEDAW supra note 52. 
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Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),160 now joined by 189 states, has 
been consistently interpreted by the expert CEDAW committee to prohibit 
violence against women.161 Regional treaties expressly prohibiting violence 
against women have been joined by every OAS nation in Latin America and the 
Caribbean,162 and by 42 states in Africa.163 
 
E. NEWLY IDENTIFIED ACTORS 
 
International human rights law and policy now protect against non-State 
actors who were not addressed by the 1948 UDHR.164 For example, in 2011 the 
U.N. Human Rights Council adopted, without dissent, the U.N. Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, which impose on business a 
“responsibility to respect” human rights.165 While not legally binding on 
business, those principles have been widely embraced by states, international 
organizations, industry associations, individual companies, and by some human 
rights organizations.166 Nowadays the potential impacts of business on human 
rights—both positive and negative167—are too important for U.S. foreign policy 
to ignore, simply because they were not recognized by our nation’s founding 
documents or by the UDHR. Yet the Commission’s Report mentions only 
“violations” by non-State actors,168 without mentioning the post-1948 norms 






160 U.N. Secretary-General, supra notes 48; CEDAW, supra note 52. 
161 U.N. Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 8th 
Sess., CEDAW General Recommendation No. 12:  Violence Against Women, 1989; U.N. CEDAW, 
11th Sess., CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19:  Violence Against Women, 1992; U.N. 
CEDAW, 67th Sess., General Recommendation No. 35, 2017. 
162 Organization of American states, Inter-American Convention, on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence against Women, Aug. 9, 1994, OAS treaty A-61 (joined by 32 states).  See 
ratification table at General Information of the Treaty: A-61, DEP’T OF INT’L LAW, 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-61.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2020)).  Cuba, which refuses 
to participate in the OAS, is the only independent Latin American or Caribbean State not party to this 
OAS treaty. See General Information of the Treaty: A-61, DEP’T OF INT’L LAW, 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-61.html. (last visited Dec. 1, 2020). 
163 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 
art. IV.2 (a)–(f), July 11, 2003 (See list of states partiesstates parties at List of Countries which have 
Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa, AFRICAN UNION, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37077-sl-
PROTOCOL%20TO%20THE%20AFRICAN%20CHARTER%20ON%20HUMAN%20AND%20P
EOPLE%27S%20RIGHTS%20ON%20THE%20RIGHTS%20OF%20WOMEN%20IN%20AFRIC
A.pdf). (last visited Dec. 1, 2020)). 
164 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) 
(calling on “every individual and every organ of society” to strive by “teaching and education” to 
promote and secure human rights). 
165 G.A. Res. 17/4, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (June 
16, 2011) (endorsing the Guiding Principles, annexed to the Report of the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General, at 13-16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011)). 
166 See, e.g., World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 
https://www.wbcsd.org/Programs/People/Social-Impact/Human-Rights (last visited Dec. 1, 2020) 
(advocating that companies embed the Guiding Principles into their operations). 
167 John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), Protect, Respect and Remedy: a 
Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶¶ 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5, (Apr. 7, 2008). 
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F. LIMITS 
 
Not every right in international human rights law is consistent with 
American law and values. For example, Article 20 of the Civil and Political 
Covenant requires state parties to prohibit “propaganda for war” and “[a]ny 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence.”169 
In contrast, U.S. constitutional jurisprudence reflects the higher value we 
place on free speech. Our First Amendment safeguards hate speech unless it is 
“[1] directed to inciting or producing [2] imminent lawless action and is [3] 
likely to incite or produce such action.”170 Accordingly, when the U.S. joined 
the ICCPR in 1992, we made a reservation to Article 20, to preserve our broader 
scope of free speech.171 
Our foreign policy should not seek to impose our broader view of free 
speech on others.172 However, neither should we accept the ICCPR’s narrower 
conception, which is contrary to our fundamental values and law.  On this issue 
we should, in effect, respectfully agree to differ. 
In general, however, U.S. constitutional jurisprudence is compatible with 
international treaty law. Although the U.S. made other reservations to the ICCPR 
(and to the race and torture conventions), none reflects an inconsistency with 




In short, for at least five sets of reasons, in addition to the human rights 
groups’ objections, grounding U.S. foreign policy on human rights only in our 
nation’s founding documents and the 1948 UDHR risks undermining “decades 
of human rights progress.”174 Except where international human rights law 
conflicts with basic American values, as in the case of the limits on free speech, 
our foreign policy should take account of widely supported international human 
rights treaties and declarations. 
 
 
VI. MERITS OF THE REPORT 
 
The Commission’s Report is commendable for a number of important 
points. It would be regrettable if they were to become lost amid the protest over 
 
 
169 ICCPR, supra note 145, at art. 20, §2. 
170 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
171 "(1) That article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States that 
would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.” Reservations of the United States of America to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966), 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec (last visited Dec. 1, 2020). 
172 The Commission agrees. See Report, note 3 at 25, 36-37, 39. 
173 When the U.S. ratified the ICCPR in 1992, it made a Reservation preserving the right to impose 
capital punishment “for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.” ICCPR, supra 
note 145, at art. 6, §5.  However, since then, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the Constitution 
prohibits the juvenile death penalty.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
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the Report’s politicized context, constrained mandate, and certain of its 
conclusions. The Report’s positive aspects include at least the following: 
 
• its condemnation of racial injustice in the U.S., 
• its appropriately modest assessment of the U.S. human rights 
record, 
• its holistic reading of the UDHR, 
• its abstention from any claim that human rights demand 
acceptance of conservative religious or political positions on 
social issues, 
• its bipartisan history of the U.S. stance on human rights,  
• its prioritization of the role of human rights in government, 
• its timely criticisms of Russia and China on human rights, and  
• its call for human rights to be an important component of our 
foreign policy. 
 




The Report does not sugarcoat American violations of human rights. 
Particularly in the area of racial injustice, the Report gives special recognition 
to “the sin of slavery,” calling it “our nation’s deepest violation of unalienable 
rights.”175 While rightly praising structural safeguards (e.g., limited powers, 
separation of powers) in our Constitution of 1789, the Report laments that the 
Founders’ basic charter “betrayed the promise of unalienable rights by giving 
legal protection to slavery.”176 
The Report traces this betrayal through U.S. history. Lauding federalism, it 
nonetheless recalls that “under the banner of states’ rights, states exploited 
federalism to shield slavery and prolong discrimination.”177 In the 1930s, “Even 
the New Deal’s sweeping reform of labor law excluded agricultural and 
domestic workers, a large proportion of whom were members of racial and 
ethnic minorities.”178 
In the present day, “[t]he brutal killing of an African-American man by a 
police officer in the late spring of 2020 and the subsequent civic unrest that 
swept the country underscore that much still must be accomplished.”179 The 
Report stresses “the nation’s unfinished work in overcoming the evil effects of 






175 Report, supra note 3, at 9. 
176 Id. at 18. 
177 Id. at 15. 
178 Id. at 22.   
179 Id. at 24. 
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Although the Report does not pretend to undertake a comprehensive 
historical survey, it is also appropriately modest about the U.S. record in other 
areas of human rights. “Americans rightly take pride in their constitutional 
tradition.”181 However, we must “show the same honest self-examination and 
efforts at improvement” that we expect of others.182 The U.S. is “burdened with 
a history of grave departures from the principles of freedom and equality both at 
home and abroad.”183 
At home, “under the flag of Manifest Destiny, the United States cruelly 
expelled Native Americans from their ancestral lands with tremendous cost in 
human life and compelled them to enter into treaties that it failed to honor.”184 
There has been “much in America with which to struggle,” including 
“discrimination against immigrants and other vulnerable minorities; and the 
imposition of legal liabilities on, and the withholding of opportunities from, 
women.”185 Yet “[p]rogress toward the securing of rights for all has often been 
excruciatingly slow and has been interrupted by periods of lamentable 
backsliding.”186 
Abroad, the U.S. “has sided at times with dictators and undermined 
expressions of democratic will. And the United States has undertaken military 
actions that, many have concluded, were ill-conceived and damaging to the 
cause of freedom.”187 Given this record, “the nation must be humble in light of 
the work that remains to be done.”188 
Such assessments might be unremarkable coming from, say, Human Rights 
Watch. But from a commission appointed by possibly the most jingoistic, least 





Reflecting the scholarship of Professor Glendon,189 the Report offers a 
holistic view of the UDHR.190 The UDHR has both civil and political, as well as 
economic, social and cultural rights.191 However, the UDHR “is not a mere list 
of severable, free-standing provisions, each understood in isolation and on its 
own terms.”192 It embodies a “holistic understanding of individual rights in 
community.”193 It was “written and understood as an integrated set of 
interlocking principles. Each principle was like an instrument that made an 
essential contribution to the harmony of the whole ensemble.”194 
 
 
181 Report, supra note 3, at 54–55. 
182 Id. at 44. 
183 Id. at 43. 
184 Id. at 43. 
185 Id. at 8–9. 
186 Report, supra note 3, at 9. 
187 Id. at 43. 
188 Id. at 9. 
189 See authorities cited in Glendon, supra note 12. 
190 Report, supra note 3, at 29-33. 
191 Id. at 30. 
192 Id. at 31  
193 Id. 
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The Report does not take this understanding to what seems to me to be its 
logical conclusion —that economic, social, and cultural rights are “interlocked” 
with, and no less human rights, than are civil and political rights.195 Still, the 
Commission’s holistic reading lays the foundation for what should be an 
unsurprising conclusion: that all rights in the UDHR, including economic, 
social, and cultural rights, are universal human rights.  
 
D. SOCIAL ISSUES 
 
When the Commission was announced, opponents expressed fears that its 
“deeply conservative” patronage, mission, and Chair would “threaten sexual 
equality, LGBTQ rights and reproductive health globally.”196 
To the Commission’s credit, however, it resisted any temptation to equate 
human rights with conservative religious or political positions on hot-button 
social issues. Perhaps this was because, as they openly state, the Commissioners 
were “not of one mind on many issues where there are conflicting interpretations 
of human rights claims—abortion, affirmative action, and capital punishment, 
to name a few.”197 
Whatever the reason, their Report admits that no “single answer” to 
metaphysical questions of “natural rights” (a term for “human rights” at the 
time198) was “decisive in 1776. Still less today. . . .”199 The Report acknowledges 
the reality that “[i]n divisive social and political controversies in the United 
States—abortion, affirmative action, same-sex marriage—it is common for both 
sides to couch their claims in terms of basic rights.”200 This is simply an 
empirical fact, one on which all sides to these social controversies might 
agree.201 
 
E. BIPARTISAN HISTORY 
 
Appointed by a Republican Administration, the Commission nonetheless 
repeatedly cites Democrats in its summary history of U.S. commitments to 
human rights. They include Woodrow Wilson,202 Eleanor Roosevelt,203 Franklin 
 
 
195 See infra Part VII.C. 
196 Katherine M. Marino, How Mike Pompeo’s New Commission on ‘Unalienable Rights’ Butchers 
History, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/08/15/how-mike-pompeos-new-commission-
unalienable-rights-butchers-history/. 
197 Report at 7. 
198 Id. at 12 (Unalienable rights were “sometimes referred to as natural rights in the founding era and 
today commonly called human rights. . . .”) 
199 Id. at 11. 
200 Id. at 24. 
201 See, for example, the conflicting arguments in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (rights of gay persons to be free from discrimination versus 
freedom of speech and free exercise of religion by a baker who refused to bake a special cake for 
same sex marriage).  Although the baker won a 7-2 decision by the Court, the point here is simply 
that claims of basic rights, as often occurs, were made on both sides. 
202 Report, supra note 3, at 43. 







24 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.  vol. XI:1 
Roosevelt,204 Harry Truman,205 and Jimmy Carter,206 among others,207 along 
with Ronald Reagan.208   
Despite this gesture, the historical record is not evenly bipartisan. 
Diplomatically left unsaid is the reality that Democratic administrations and 
Senates have generally been somewhat more open to international human rights 
treaties than Republican ones.209 For example, would any recent Republican 
president have advocated ratification of all five human rights treaties, and 
acceptance of three international complaint procedures, presented by Jimmy 
Carter to the Senate?210 
Even so, the Report is not inaccurate in stating that a cautious approach has 
been “the consistent orientation of the U.S. State Department to international 
human rights law and institutions for at least the past half-century, under both 
Democratic and Republican administrations.”211 
 
F. GOVERNMENT PRIORITY 
 
The Report is clear that human rights should be a top priority for all 
governments: “The [U.S.] Declaration [of Independence] also holds it to be a 
self-evident truth that the first task of political society is to ensure that 
unalienable rights are respected: ‘to secure these rights, Governments are 
instituted among Men.’”212 Similarly, the UDHR “affirms that all nations’ 
political institutions and laws should be judged by their ability to secure the 
rights that individuals everywhere share.”213 
That includes our government: “The most important obligation of the United 
States government under the Constitution is to protect its citizens’ unalienable 
rights, which it accomplishes by giving expression to those rights in the positive 
law of the land.”214 
 
G. RUSSIA AND CHINA 
 
Naming “flagrant human rights abusers—such as China, Cuba, Libya, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela,” the Report accurately observes that “a 
large portion of the globe now lives in countries with scant human rights 
 
 
204 Id. at 21, 43. 
205 Id. at 22. 
206 Id. at 43, 44, 46. 
207 Id. at 44 (Senator Henry Jackson and Rep. Charles Vanik), 45 (Rep. Donald Fraser). 
208 Id. at 44, 46. 
209 See, e.g., infra Part VII.E. 
210 See generally Jimmy Carter, U.S. President, Human Rights Treaties Message to the Senate, (Feb. 
23, 1978), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JAMES E. CARTER, JR. 
1978 at 395 (1979), (Race Convention; Civil and Political Covenant; Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights Covenant; American Convention on Human Rights; individual complaints under Race 
Convention, and State-to-State complaints under the Civil and Political Covenant, and the American 
Convention); Jimmy Carter, U.S. President, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention, (Nov. 12, 
1980), in 3 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JAMES E. CARTER, JR. 1980-
81 at 2715 (1982). 
211 Report, supra note 3, at 41. 
212 Id. at 11–12. 
213 Id. at 12. 
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protection. Among these countries, the most influential are Russia and 
China.”215 
In deploring the current attitudes and practices on human rights by the 
governments of Russia and China, the Commission is in the good company of 
major human rights groups otherwise critical of its Report, such as Amnesty 
International216 and Human Rights Watch.217 
Today’s world has no shortage of gross violators of human rights. The 
Commission’s Report rightly singles out the most influential violators, Russia 
and China, for extended discussion.218 If anything, the Commission understates 
the threat to human rights posed by the rising economic, military, and diplomatic 
power of China.219 Unless Beijing’s orientation changes dramatically, human 
rights will likely be under mounting and greater threat in the coming decades 
than at any time since 1948. 
 
 
215 Id. at 49. 
216 Russia: Amnesty’s most recent summary states, “Russia’s human rights record continued to 
deteriorate, with the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly consistently 
restricted . . . . Those attempting to exercise these rights faced reprisals, ranging from harassment to 
police ill-treatment, arbitrary arrest, heavy fines and in some cases criminal prosecution and 
imprisonment. Human rights defenders and NGOs were targeted . . . . Hundreds of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses were persecuted for their faith. Other vulnerable minorities also faced discrimination and 
persecution. Counter-terrorism provisions were widely used to target dissent . . . . Torture remained 
pervasive, as did impunity for its perpetrators. Violence against women remained widespread and 
inadequately addressed . . . . Refugees were forcibly returned to destinations where they were at risk 
of torture.” Amnesty INT’L, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA: REVIEW OF 
2019 24 (2020) (Index: EUR 01/1355/2020). 
China: Even before recent deteriorations, Amnesty’s most recent world report summarized human 
rights in China as follows: “The government continued to draft and enact new laws under the guise 
of ‘national security’ that presented serious threats to human rights. Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu 
Xiaobo died in custody. Activists and human rights defenders were detained, prosecuted and 
sentenced on the basis of vague and overbroad charges. . . . Police detained human rights defenders 
outside formal detention facilities, sometimes incommunicado, for long periods, which posed 
additional risk of torture and other ill-treatment . . . . Controls on the internet were strengthened. 
Repression of religious activities outside state-sanctioned churches increased. Repression conducted 
under “anti-separatism” or “counterterrorism” campaigns remained particularly severe in 
the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and Tibetan-populated areas. Freedom of expression in 
Hong Kong came under attack . . . .” AMNESTY INT’L, REPORT 2017/18: THE STATE OF THE 
WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 125 (2018) (Index: POL 10/6700/2018). 
217 E.g., Yaqiu Wang, In China, the “Great Firewall” is Changing a Generation, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Sept. 1, 2020, 11:57 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/01/china-great-firewall-
changing-generation (originally published in Politico); Rachel Denber, Russia Needs an 
Investigation into Navalny’s Illness: Kremlin Critic is Fighting for his Life, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(Aug. 21, 2020, 12:02 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/21/russia-needs-investigation-
navalnys-illness. 
218 Report, supra note 3, at 49–52. 
219 According to the World Bank, China’s total real income, measured in PPP (purchasing power 
parity) terms, surpassed that of the U.S. in 2017. Jeffrey Frankel, Is China Overtaking the US as a 
Financial and Economic Power?, THE GUARDIAN (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/may/29/is-china-overtaking-the-us-as-a-financial-and-
economic-power. Entrepreneur Elon Musk predicts that China’s economy will double or triple that of 
the U.S. Amanda Macias & Jessica Bursztynsky, Elon Musk says Chinese Economy Will Surpass US 
by 2 or 3 Times: ‘The Foundation of War is Economics,’ CNBC (Feb. 28, 2020), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/28/musk-says-chinese-economy-will-surpass-the-us-by-two-or-
three-times.html.  For military power, see, e.g., John Grady, Pentagon Report: China Now Has 
World’s Largest Navy as Beijing Expands Military Influence, USNI NEWS (Sept. 1, 2020), 
https://news.usni.org/2020/09/01/pentagon-report-china-now-has-worlds-largest-navy-as-beijing-
expands-military-influence. For diplomatic influence, see, e.g., Ben Westcott, China has overtaken 








26 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.  vol. XI:1 
 
H. FOREIGN POLICY 
 
The Report recognizes the threat, not only from Russia and China, but from 
other authoritarian governments: “[W]ith hundreds of millions of men and 
women around the world suffering extreme forms of deprivation under harsh 
authoritarian regimes, we are of one mind on the urgent need for the United 
States to vigorously champion human rights in its foreign policy.”220 
This is no minor matter: “America must rise to today’s challenges with the 
same energy and spirit that she brought to the building of a new international 
order in the wake of two world wars.”221 In such an endeavor, the U.S. cannot 
succeed unilaterally: “With freedom, human equality, and democracy facing 
strong ideological opposition from powerful states, this is not the moment for 
the liberal democracies of the world to falter in defending the principles that 
have enabled them to achieve ‘better standards of life in larger freedom.’”222 Yet 
“even some liberal democracies appear to be losing sight of the urgency of 
human rights in a comprehensive foreign policy.”223 
Although the Commission apparently shrinks from using the word 
“multilateralism,” the resulting implications are clear, even if understated. The 
Report “notes the likelihood that U.S. measures to promote human rights abroad 
will be more effective when carried out in cooperation with other nations. No 
nation alone can achieve all that is necessary to bring human rights to life, and 
one nation acting by itself will always be suspected, fairly or unfairly, of ulterior 
motives.”224 
In spite of its clarion call, the Commission is not naïve about the potential 
role of human rights in U.S. foreign policy. Its Report recognizes that the 
implications of human rights for foreign affairs are “more diffuse and indirect 
than they are for domestic affairs,”225 because of the “multiple factors that must 
be considered in the formation of foreign policy.”226 
Still, the “self-evident truths concerning individual freedom and human 
equality on which the United States was founded nevertheless should inform and 
elevate America’s conduct in the world.”227 The Commission might have added 
that the global consensus reflected in widely supported international human 
rights instruments should likewise inform and elevate U.S. foreign policy.  
 
 
VII. CRITICISMS OF THE REPORT 
 
As noted above, the Commission’s draft Report, later adopted as its final 
Report with only minor changes, was roundly criticized on multiple grounds by 
more than 200 organizational and individual human rights advocates in a letter 
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to Chairperson Glendon.228 They object to Secretary Pompeo’s “political 
agenda” underlying the Commission’s work, adding that “the failure of the 
Secretary and the Commission to acknowledge the many Trump administration 
policies that have significantly undermined America’s leadership on human 
rights undercuts both the Commission’s standing and the report itself.”229 
Even though the Commission might respond that its mandate was to focus 
on “principle, not policy formulation,”230 the perception that it gives a free pass 
to its patron is not easily dispelled. However, my present assessment attempts to 
meet the Commission on its own ground, and to consider only its analysis of 
human rights principles.231 
At the level of principles, the letter from the human rights advocates 
(hereafter “HR advocates”) identifies five “most concerning aspects” of the 
Report. Recall that the HR advocates were given only a token two weeks to 
respond to the Commission’s Report.232 With more time, some who signed 
might have chosen differing words, nuances, or priorities.   
The following are my attempts to paraphrase the concerns of the HR 
advocates together with brief observations on each concern:233 
 
A. PROLIFERATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS: 
 
HR Advocates: The proliferation of new claims does not undermine the 
legitimacy and credibility of human rights. On the contrary, this “growing 
understanding of rights should be celebrated as an accomplishment worth 
protecting—one that fulfills the promise of human rights . . . .”234 
Observations: The response of the HR advocates is generally on the mark. 
New human rights treaties and declarations are not easily achieved; they 
generally require an enormous amount of work over an extended period of time 
in order to gain widespread acceptance. Wary of being held to account for 
expanding obligations, many states do not lightly accept new claims of human 
rights. 
That does not necessarily mean that political claims never succeed in 
winning broad acceptance as human rights. But if undeserving claims have been 
broadly accepted as human rights, it seems to me that the Commission has the 
burden of identifying at least what it considers to be leading examples and 
explaining why they do not qualify. Its Report does neither. 
 
B. MEANING AND SCOPE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:  
 
HR Advocates: There is no “untenable uncertainty” about the meaning of 
human rights. Human rights have been clarified by the UDHR and the nine core 
UN treaties. “That the current administration might not agree with these 
 
 
228 Glendon, supra note 12. 
229 Id. 
230 Report, supra note 3, at 7. 
231 This by no means suggests that I approve of Trump Administration policies on human rights. I 
oppose most of them, but those are issues for another day. 
232 Supra Part I.C. 
233 Glendon, supra note 12, at 2–4. 
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instruments and their obligations in full or in part does not mean that there is 
confusion about human rights.”235 
Observations: Initial uncertainty about meaning and scope is inherent in 
broad legal phrases, including human rights like “freedom of speech” and 
“freedom of religion,” until interpreted. As illustrated in Part V above, phrases 
such as “fair” and “public” trial in the UDHR have subsequently been specified 
in greater detail by broadly supported human rights treaties and declarations. 
There is far more definitional uncertainty in the UDHR than in subsequent 
international human rights law. Focusing on the UDHR, and downplaying 
subsequent international law, as Secretary Pompeo requested and as the 
Commission’s Report does, makes any problem of uncertainty worse, not better.  
Human rights are also interpreted by the jurisprudence of international 
courts and experts, applying the norms in the instruments that create them. As 
with U.S. Supreme Court decisions, there are inevitably disputes over particular 
interpretations, often evidenced in dissenting opinions by judges. However, the 
solution is not simply to retreat to the broad wording of the U.S. Constitution or 
UDHR and eschew any interpretation at all. Again, simply ignoring international 
human rights case law, as the Commission’s Report does, makes problems of 
uncertainty worse, not better. 
However, not all instruments denominated as human rights are broadly 
accepted. Simply referring, as do the HR advocates, to the nine core UN human 
rights treaties, is not dispositive. As noted in Part II above, two of those nine 
treaties (on migrant workers and enforced disappearances) are not widely 
ratified. There is a case to be made that they are nonetheless human rights. 
However, making that case would require more extended analysis than presented 
in the HR advocates’ necessarily swift and brief letter responding to the 
Commission’s draft Report.  
 
C. RIGHTS HIERARCHIES:  
 
HR Advocates: Even though the Report acknowledges that rights are 
“universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated,” it then “prioritizes 
property rights and religious liberty over other civil and political rights, and 
advocates for the de-prioritization of socioeconomic rights, including by putting 
increased emphasis on rights interpreted from specific American documents, 
rather than those guaranteed in international treaties that bind the United States 
and other governments.”236   
Observations: As often happens in reports drafted by committee, the Report 
is both internally inconsistent and ambiguous on the hierarchy of rights. On the 
one hand, the Report argues persuasively that “it defies the intent and structure 
of the UDHR to pick and choose among its rights according to preferences and 
ideological presuppositions while ignoring other fundamental rights.”237 The 
Report cites with approval the statement in the 1993 Vienna Declaration that “all 
human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.”238 
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On the other hand, elsewhere in the Report, there are suggestions that 
Secretary Pompeo’s “foremost” rights—property rights and religious 
liberty239—have a higher status in the hierarchy of rights. Property rights are 
“central to the effective exercise of positive rights and to the pursuit of happiness 
in family, community, and worship.”240 Religious liberty enjoys “similar 
primacy in the American political tradition.”241 
But are these philosophical affirmations, or merely historical observations? 
For example, the Report states, “Prominent among the unalienable rights that 
government is established to secure, from the founders’ point of view, are 
property rights and religious liberty. A political society that destroys the 
possibility of either loses its legitimacy.”242 Is this the Commission’s view of 
legitimacy, or merely a description of the “founders’ point of view”? 
In light of the Commission’s mandate, one might argue that this ambiguity 
does not matter. A Report commissioned to reaffirm “unalienable rights,” as 
understood by America’s founders and in the UDHR, by definition embraces the 
“founders’ point of view.” However, as noted in Part VI above, the Report 
expressly condemns the founders’ embrace of slavery. So, the Commission and 
the founders do not agree on everything. Do they agree on the centrality of 
property rights and the primacy of religious liberty?   
And, even if they do, does this mean that these rights have higher status than 
other vitally important human rights, such as freedom of speech, racial equality, 
and freedom from torture? Or is the Commission merely arguing that property 
rights and religious liberty should not be viewed as any less important? 
Less ambiguity attends the HR advocates’ further objection that the Report 
de-prioritizes socioeconomic rights. Quoting article 22 of the UDHR, the Report 
does cite the “social and economic rights indispensable for [a person’s] dignity 
and the free development of his personality.”243 However, the Report also 
equates these rights with mere “positive rights” left primarily to the 
legislature,244 describes them as “aspirational principles,”245 and characterizes 
them as “controversial because they frequently involve a clash of rights 
claims.”246 They are “most compatible” with American founding principles 
when they serve as “minimums” that enable citizens to “exercise their 
unalienable rights, discharge their responsibilities, and engage in self-
government.”247 However, they are “least compatible” when they “induce 
dependence on the state, and when, by expanding state power, they curtail 
freedom”—including “the rights of property and religious liberty.”248 
In U.S. foreign policy, the Report concludes, socioeconomic rights must be 
“taken seriously,” but treated differently, “through programs of economic 
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assistance and development.”249 Such a foreign policy would retain only the 
language, but no real commitment, to socioeconomic rights.  When other 
governments fail to provide basic education or health care to their citizens,250 
especially while privileging the wealthy or incurring bloated military 
expenditures, the U.S. should take note and speak up, no less than when 
governments repress demonstrators.  Foreign aid is not an adequate substitute. 
As a percentage of our economy, U.S. foreign aid is minuscule and well below 
that of other developed nations.251 Even if it were more generous, aid is any 
event treated by Washington as a matter of grace, not right.   
International human rights law is not blind to the fact that implementation 
of socioeconomic rights depends on resources.  Honduras (GDP per person of 
$2,500),252 is not Switzerland (GDP per person over $80,000).253 Under the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,254 joined by 171 
countries,255 each state party undertakes, only “to the maximum of its available 
resources,” to take steps to achieve “progressively the full realization” of 
Covenant rights.256 Available resources include both a country’s own resources 
and economic and technical assistance received through international 
cooperation.257 Such a realistic commitment, and not a mere dependence on the 
vagaries and selectivity of foreign aid budgets, is faithful to the integral 
recognition of socioeconomic rights in the UDHR. 
 
D. SOCIAL ISSUES:  
 
HR Advocates: The “weight of both domestic and international human 
rights law . . . clearly establishes and recognizes the protection of LGBTQI+ 
rights and sexual and reproductive rights, including abortion, as human rights 
imperatives.”258 For the Report to suggest otherwise is to “substitute the 
ideology of the Administration and opinion of 11 individuals”259 for these laws. 
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Observations: The Commission Report does not deny the existence of these 
social rights, observing only that claims of rights are made by both sides on these 
contentious issues.260 Even if the “weight” of international human rights law 
recognizes reproductive rights, including abortion in some circumstances, there 
remain important exceptions.261 While equality based on gender identity and 
sexual preference is rapidly gaining ground in international law, it is by no 
means yet universally recognized in regard to all rights. For example, a 
constitutional right to same sex marriage was recognized only in 2015 by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.262 A human right to same sex marriage was recognized 
only in 2017 by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,263 but was rejected 
in 2016 by the European Court of Human Rights.264 In any event, both 
domestically265 and internationally, these rights –important as they are–may 
sometimes be limited by the rights of religious objectors “in a democratic 
society.”266 
 
E. NEW RIGHTS:  
 
HR Advocates: The Report’s restrictive criteria for recognizing new rights 
would “sideline the post-1948 treaties and processes by which human rights 
have properly been interpreted to cover marginalized groups and circumstances 
not explicitly addressed in the treaties in a manner consistent with their 
principles.”267 
Observations: As argued in Part V above, this objection is well-taken. 
The Report argues that the development of new rights in positive law “must 
be informed by thoughtfulness and due deliberation,” and that this “reflects the 
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consistent orientation of the U.S. State Department to international human rights 
law and institutions for at least the past half century.”268 
No responsible person would argue for acceptance of new rights 
thoughtlessly and without due deliberation. However, the U.S. record toward 
international human rights law owes at least as much to a high constitutional 
barrier and to domestic politics. Unlike many democracies,269 the U.S. 
Constitution requires a two-thirds supermajority of the Senate to consent to 
ratification of treaties.270 A minority of only thirty-four Senators can block 
consent to a human rights treaty.    
Combined with domestic political divisions, this barrier can become 
insuperable. For example—after due deliberation—President Carter referred the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(adopted in 1979) to the Senate for ratification in November 1980. But the 
Senate did not act on the treaty in Carter’s few remaining weeks in office.  The 
Convention was then opposed by the Administrations of Ronald Reagan and 
George H.W. Bush. 
In 1994 President Clinton sent a treaty package to the Senate for ratification 
of the Convention, but it “never came to vote in the full Senate because of 
opposition from several Senators.”271 In 2002 the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee voted twelve to seven to report the Convention favorably, but 
Congress adjourned before the Senate could vote on the treaty. In 2007, the Bush 
Administration informed the Senate that it did not support action on the 
Convention at that time.   
In 2009, the Obama Administration informed the Senate that it supported 
action on the Convention “at this time,” and in 2010 reiterated its support for the 
treaty.272 However, by 2014, despite the support of the Administration and the 
Chair of the Senate Committee, supporters still had not managed to win the 
support of the sixty-seven Senators.273 Today the U.S. remains one of only a 




There are legitimate criticisms, as well as points to admire, both in the 
Report’s idiosyncratic conception of human rights and in the U.S. record on 
international human rights. However, there can be little dispute that authoritarian 
regimes are now on the march around the world, and that the government of the 
rising superpower in China rejects many of the basic concepts of freedom, 
democracy, and human rights that have animated international human rights law 
since 1945.   
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The Commission is then right to recommend that, “in this moment of crisis 
for the human rights idea, America must pursue that cause with renewed vigor, 
with pride in what has been accomplished, with humility born of the awareness 
of her own ‘shortcomings and imperfections’ and of the complexities of world 
politics . . . .”274 
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